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Abstract — The IPSec protocols architecture that can be ap-
plied in tactical Intranet based on the IPv6 protocol stack for
wireless environment is the subject of the paper. The potential
usefulness of the new version of IP protocol is very important
for tactical communication systems. Additionally, Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) security working group pro-
poses recommendations covering the RFC 2401, 2402, 2406,
that describe the security architecture for Internet Proto-
col. These standards, published by IETF are discussed here
in military requirements context. The NATO C3 Technical
Architecture model also recommends these issues. The con-
cept of the IPSec architecture in military systems is described
in the paper. The position of the security applications de-
signed for subscriber devices with reference to layered model
is also presented. The concept presented here is defined for
the tactical level.
Keywords — IPSec, tactical Intranet, IP security.
1. Introduction
The modern Armed Forces need modern solutions, espe-
cially in the area of communication systems. For example,
local area networks (LAN) have became just essential part
of contemporary military units (command posts). Along
with commercial of the shelf products (COTS) application,
their security have became very important factor that have
to be taken into account. The new standard covering the
IPv6 protocol, that is still tested, includes mechanisms suit-
able for military systems. It is associated with security
mechanisms (authentication, privacy and payload encryp-
tion) and mobile subscribers access to services and network
resources as well as with the high quality of services re-
quirements [6, 7].
The IPv6 have been designing as an evolution from IPv4
rather than as a major change. Useful features of IPv4
were carried over in IPv6 and less useful features were
dropped. According to the IPv6 specification, the changes
from IPv4 to IPv6 can be split primarily into the following
categories [4]:
 Inherent security support. The IPv6 enables and
enforces the IPSec authentication and encryption fea-
tures through the extension headers. If authentication
header (AH) is carried with the IP datagram, the re-
ceiving host must check the packet validity.
 Mobility support. The IPv6 protocol supports mo-
bility management as an inherent function of IPv6
compared to the IPv4 that supports mobility through
an additional protocol added on a top of IPv4 [5].
 Built-in route optimization. In IPv6 the correspon-
dent node (CN) can learn so-called care-of-address
(COA) of the mobile node (MN). The route optimiza-
tion helps to prevent a problem of triangle routing.
In triangle routing an incoming to MN traffic always
passes through the home agent (HA), what can cause
undesirable increasing the traffic load in the home
network. Inherent route optimization is a major im-
provement compared to the IPv4 mobility protocol,
which specifies route optimization as a separate ex-
tension to the mobility protocol. More importantly,
all IPv6 nodes support route optimization while only
mobile nodes in IPv4 can support the mobility ex-
tension.
The very large address space of IPv6 is the best-known
feature of this protocol, but it is less interesting for mil-
itary environment that has a relatively small dedicated
Internet. The rich address formats are architecturally in-
teresting: multicast supporting conferencing and broadcast
applications; anycast supporting such activities as “use the
nearest server”. The attractiveness of such facilities is prin-
cipally used to reduce the management of the network and
bandwidth requirements as well. The auto-configuration fa-
cility could also reduce the running costs of the network as
the address assignment can occur without participation of
network administrator. However, this raise a security con-
cern in loss of administrative control over the allocation of
addresses in the network.
Tactical military networks are predominantly radio based
and “on the move” with minimal fixed infrastructure. Also,
security and mobility efficiency play essential role from
military point of view.
The detailed background of the tactical Intranet structure
that uses IPv6 protocol stack discussed here is clarified
in [3] and [8]. The authors have limited the discussion
only to the security problem that is applied to the tactical
environment, treated the tactical network as a non-secure
medium (denoted in the figures as a cloud).
2. The IPSec features
Security features of IPv6 have been obtained mainly by
means of two dedicated extension header [1, 2]: authenti-
cation header (AH) and encrypted security payload (ESP)
with complementary capabilities.
The AH header was designed to ensure authenticity and
integrity of the IP packet. Its presence guards against
two threats: the fixed fields illegal modification and packet
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spoofing. On the other hand, the ESP header provides data
encapsulation with encryption in order to ensure that only
the destination node can read the payload conveyed by the
IP packet. The two headers can be used together to provide
all the security features simultaneously (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Combining privacy and authentication: (a) encryp-
tion before authentication; (b) authentication before encryption.
Explanations: IP-H – IP based header plus extensions headers,
AH – authentication header, ESP-H – encapsulating security pay-
load header, ET – encapsulating security payload trailing fields.
Both the AH and the ESP headers use a concept of the
security association (SA) to agree on the security algo-
rithms and parameters between the sender and the receiver.
In general, each IPv6 node manages a set of SAs, one for
each currently active secure communication. The security
parameters index (SPI) is a parameter contained in both the
AH and ESP headers to specify which SA will be used in
decryption and/or authentication the packet.
In unicast transmissions, the SPI is normally chosen by
the destination node and sent back to the sender when the
communication is set up. In multicast transmissions, the
SPI must be common to all the members of the multi-
cast group. Each node must be able to identify the right
SA correctly by combining the SPI with the multicast
address.
The negotiation of the SA (and the related SPI) is an
integral part of the protocol for the exchange of security
keys.
Correct application of the AH and ESP headers requires
that all the communicating parties agree on a common key
to be used in forming and checking the security headers.
The IPv6 allows key management to occur either out-of-
band or with specifically crafted protocols. However, no
general agreement has been reached yet on this subject
within the Internet community, with different groups stress-
ing different needs: fast key exchange, strong authentica-
tion, lightweight protocols, and others. Key management
is the area that is still mostly unsettled within the whole
IPSec architecture.
The IPv6 requires each implementation to allow for man-
ual setting of the security keys, in case of no in-line key
management technique is adopted or human-based security
is desired. Obviously, manual keying is possible only if
the security administrators have separately agreed out-of-
band on the keys to be used – for example, at a reserved
meeting. This solution exhibits high personnel costs and
does not scale well because it requires personal action of
an operator on each network device taking part in the secure
channel. Additionally, it can generate a false sense of secu-
rity. The human intervention does not automatically ensure
a higher level of security, due to untrusted administrators
and residual problems related to hardware and software in-
tegrity of the device where the key is set. However, in spite
of these disadvantages, manual key management finds ap-
plication in restricted environments, with a small number
of devices physically secured, that according to the security
policy, can operate only when explicitly enabled by human
intervention.
Within the IPSec, key management is surely the area that is
less settled and the area in which much work has yet to be
done before arriving at a set of protocols that completely
meet the security needs at the IP level. The only decision
that has already been made is that, for the sake of general-
ity, the Internet key management protocol (IKMP) will be
placed at the application layer, and it will be independent
of the protocols at the lower layers.
The first proposal is to base IKMP on the coupling of the
Internet security association and key management proto-
col (ISAKMP) and Oakley protocols, as described in the
IEFT Draft, the resolution of ISAKMP with Oakley.
The ISAKMP defines a generic architecture for authenti-
cated SA setup and key exchange, without specifying the
actual algorithms to be used. In this way, it can be used
with different key exchange techniques.
Oakley is a key-exchange protocol, based on a modified
version of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. Therefore, it is
one of the natural partners for ISAKMP.
However, in addition to the ISAKMP-Oakley couple, dif-
ferent solutions are being proposed. Currently, the ma-
jor competitor is simple key-management for Internet Pro-
tocols (SKIP), which bases its operations on the Diffie-
Hellman algorithm. The SKIP is simple and addresses sev-
eral problems of key management in high-speed networks,
such as zero-message key setup and updates that permit fast
dynamic rekeying (that is, frequent in-line change of the se-
curity keys to avoid analytic attacks based on accumulation
of cyphertext encrypted with the same key). Moreover,
although SKIP is not standardized yet, it already features
many commercial-level implementations, both for UNIX
workstations and for personal computers.
So the war of the key-management protocols is raging, and
the likely outcome is that more than one protocol will attain
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RFC status, because these protocols exhibit different merits
that are valuable in different application environments.
3. Tactical Intranet security
The AH and ESP headers can be used in different ways to
protect IP transmission.
In IPv6, achieving good level of security is easier and more
standard than in IPv4, thanks to the AH and ESP headers.
As an example, with reference to Fig. 2, let us suppose
that a TCP session (channel) between host denoted H1
in network named N1 and host H2 in network N2 has
to be protected only against data manipulation and origin
falsification, while data privacy is not required. In this
case, the AH header can be used in the following way.
The firewall FW1 gets the IP packet and modifies it by
adding an AH header before sending it to its partner fire-
wall FW2. When this packet is received by the FW2, it
checks the packet for integrity and origin authentication
using the SPI data in the AH header. If the test is success-
ful, then the IP header and the AH header are removed,
and the remaining data (that is, the original packet) are
sent to the final destination.
Fig. 2. An example of the tunnel between two firewalls.
If the network is implemented using only the AH header,
then attackers can neither alter the transmitted packets
nor insert forged packets in the channel. However, they
can still read the content of the packets. To prevent dis-
closure of the payload, the ESP header has to be used too.
Even the usage of AH in conjunction with ESP does not
completely protect the traffic. Packets can be deleted by
intermediate nodes or recorded and later replayed. These
attacks cannot be easily contrasted at the IP level. Appro-
priate defenses (such as the use of unique packet identifiers
and the generation of heartbeat packets) are usually placed
at some upper level in the network stack. A partial solu-
tion at the IP level is likely to be offered by the new format
and algorithms that are going to replace the current ones in
the AH header.
In contrast to the IPv4, there is no problem with fragmen-
tation in IPv6, because the overhead is fixed in size (the
dimension of AH, or that of AH plus ESP) and fragmenta-
tion process is realized in source host.
This technique can be adopted even between the firewall
and the single external host (Fig. 3). Obviously, this case
is very important for guaranteed security when a mobile
host is used outside the protected network, and it is a per-
fect complement to the mobility support features of IPv6.
The firewall will act as a home agent in the neighbor discov-
ery procedure. Mobile host will be assigned two different
IP addresses: one when it is connected inside the security
perimeter of the network and the other one when it is out-
side this perimeter. In second case, the firewall will also
act as a relay, by routing packets coming from inside the
corporate network to the external address, after adding the
required headers (AH only, or AH plus ESP).
Fig. 3. Tunnel between a firewall and a single host.
This solution is not complete for application-level security
because only partial protection is obtained. AH provides
only host-based authentication, whereas applications usu-
ally require user-based authentication. Moreover, AH and
ESP protect the data only during their transmission along
the channel. After the data have been received, they are
no longer protected in any way. This fact may not be
relevant if the receiving host is a secure one, but there
is the additional implication that origin authentication and
data integrity properties are lost as well. So formal non-
repudiation cannot occur after the data have been extracted
from the secure channel.
The conclusion is that the security features of IPv6 do not
eliminate the need for other security mechanisms, which
will probably be better placed at the application level. Net-
worked applications executing on the top of the IPv6 stack
may be required in order to use the communication channel
with specific features. To avoid duplication of functionality
(and hence performance degradation) being able to spec-
ified at the transport layer, the security attributes of the
created channel are useful.
Since IP addresses in the IPv6 are quite often dynamically
assigned, it is the most importance that this process be done
in a secure fashion.
Moreover, as different security properties are available
through a proper combination of AH and ESP headers, it
is highly desirable that they should be applied to the mes-
sages exchanged by the routers, to prevent attacks aiming
to subvert the logical architecture of the network.
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Following types of communications should be pro-
tected:
 The routing advertisement messages, to ensure that
they are sent by an authorized router.
 The neighbor advertisement messages, to ensure that
they come from authorized hosts and to avoid a risk
that somebody attaches a new host to the network
without proper authorization.
 The ICMP messages related to an unreachable host
or network (destination unreachable) or to a better
route (redirect), to ensure that these messages come
from hosts or routers that were on the original path
of the packets.
Securing these types of messages is surely not trivial. For
example, the routing advertisements are sent to a multicast
group; therefore, all the routers in the group have to know
the (common) secret key to be used to verify and/or de-
crypt the messages. This fact implies that they can forge
messages and impersonate any router in the group.
Protection of the neighbor advertisements is a serious prob-
lem. These messages can be protected only after the SA
has been created between the host and the address distribu-
tion center. On the other hand, this SA can be created only
after the address has been assigned to the host, so we can
conclude that this is no correct solution. The break of the
loop is possible. For example, priority can be given to the
address assignment phase, and SA setup can be permitted
only subsequently, but in this way the address assignment
phase is not protected. Alternatively, public key authentica-
tion can be used. Each host is assigned a key pair (private
and public key) and has to be reconfigured with the public
key of the authority that signs the certificates of the routers
and the address distribution centers. The last alternative is
to configure the routers so that they do not advertise local
prefixes. In this way, each host is forced to contact a router
first.
Protection against malicious ICMP messages requires that
they should be protected by the AH header, but this ap-
proach has the drawback of requiring the establishment of
the SA with each router and host on the path between the
source and the destination of the packets.
With respect to the messages security used by the various
routing protocols, they should always be exchanged just
within the frame of the SA and should be protected by
the AH. For the sake of generality, this solution is highly
preferable to using authentication mechanisms specific for
each routing protocol.
Based on the previous analyses, we can conclude that rout-
ing security is apparently still a big problem in IPv6, but
chances of solving this problem are higher than in IPv4.
4. Conclusions
The tactical military architecture is a hierarchical arrange-
ment of mobile components. The degree of users mobility
varies with the echelon and the distance from the front. The
nature of military operations is such a changing that sig-
nificant advantage will be achieved by the creative, timely
and decisive usage of the information. Consequently, the
demand for access to the information is also changing and
evolving towards the new network-centric model based on
more comprehensive, ubiquitous and shared information
services.
From military point of view, there is no problem with ad-
dress space exhaustion in the internal networks, as they are
largely closed networks. Additionally, since such networks
are relatively small, the problem with big routing tables
does not exist.
The security features of IPv6 offer only commercial grade
of security. Specific hardware encryption have to be added
in military domain.
The IETF security architecture is open to apply additional
encryption applications. Several solutions exist clarifying
how the IPSec may be implemented to hosts in conjunction
with the router or firewall. Some solutions are integrated
into the native IP implementations and other ones are build-
in according to bump-in-the-stack (BITS) or bump-in-the-
wire (BITW) scheme [1, 9]. The second scheme enables to
use an outboard crypto processor that is common designed
feature of the security in military network.
Currently, the AH and ESP headers should be modified
along the following guidelines:
 The AH format must be substantially changed to
accommodate new and stronger authentication al-
gorithms (HMAC – keyed-hashing for message au-
thentication [10]) that support prevention of packet
replay and its cancellation ([11] describes this
format when used with the MD5 digest algorithm).
 The ESP specification must achieve a better orthog-
onality with algorithms, to simplify application of
different encryption algorithms.
The benefit of these changes is that higher security will be
available at the network level. Hence, applications will be
able to concentrate on different security aspects, such as
authorizations.
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